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On June 11, 2014, the European Commission initiated State aid 
proceedings against three Member States in respect of advance tax 
rulings granted in relation to the transfer pricing practices of certain 
multinational groups (Ireland—Apple;1 Luxembourg—Fiat;2 and the 
Netherlands—Starbucks).3 It adopted a fourth decision in the same 
series on October 7, 2014 (Luxembourg—Amazon).4 On February 3, 
                                                            
*Principal Legal Adviser, European Commission. The views expressed in this Essay are 
the Author’s alone and should not be attributed to his employer. The Author would like to 
underline his own gratitude and admiration for Pieter Jan Kuijper, who during his time in the 
Commission’s Legal Service was a source of support and inspiration for younger colleagues. 
1. Commission Notice, 2014 O.J. C 369/22. 
2. Commission Notice, 2014 O.J. C 369/37.  
3. Commission Notice, 2014 O.J. C 460/11. 
4. Commission Notice, 2014 O.J. C 44/13. 
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2015, the Commission issued a further opening decision concerning 
tax rulings (Belgium—Excess profits).5 
In a period of heightened sensitivity towards the manner in 
which multinational groups arrange their affairs and a widespread 
public perception that these groups do not pay their “fair share of 
tax,” these decisions have attracted a certain amount of attention. 
They may be seen in a broader context encompassing the Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting (“BEPS”) project currently under way in 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (the 
“OECD”)6 and the Commission’s initiatives aimed at greater tax 
transparency, including information on tax rulings.7 Thus the adoption 
of the three decisions on June 11, 2014 was accompanied by 
declarations from the members of the Commission responsible for 
competition and for taxation regarding the need to ensure fair 
application of tax rules in the interest of a level playing-field for 
business.8 Other declarations have emphasised a link between 
taxation and the location of economic activity.9 
Although the public attention these decisions have received may 
be something of a novelty, the decisions themselves do not represent a 
new departure in State aid practice. On the contrary, they are simply a 
further step in a long development of case law and decision-making 
practice which began in the era of the European Coal and Steel 
Community (“ECSC”) Treaty. If there was ever a new departure, it 
took place in the late 1990s, when increased interest in the possible 
                                                            
5. Commission Press Release, IP/15/4080 (Feb. 3, 2015). This decision deals not with 
transfer pricing issues but with a scheme under which companies taxable in Belgium which are 
members of multinational groups are permitted to deduct from their taxable profits amounts 
which exceed the profits that the company would have earned as a stand-alone entity and are 
attributable to synergies or to the distribution of tasks within the corporate group. Since the 
content of the last decision is not publicly available at time of writing it will not be discussed 
in this Essay. 
6. Including the global standard on exchange of information between tax authorities, 
now incorporated in EU legislation. See Council Directive 2014/107/EU of 9 December 2014 
amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory automatic exchange of information in 
the field of taxation, 2014 O.J. L 359/1.  
7. See Commission of the European Communities, An Action Plan to strengthen the fight 
against tax fraud and tax evasion, COM (2012) 722 Final (Dec. 12, 2012); Commission of the 
European Communities, Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2011/16/EU, as 
regards mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation, COM (2015) 
135 Final (Mar. 18, 2015); Commission of the European Communities, Communication from 
the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on tax transparency to fight tax 
evasion and avoidance, COM (2015) 136 Final (Mar. 18, 2015). 
8. See Commission Press Release IP/14/663 (June 11, 2014). 
9. See Commission Press Release IP/15/4610 (Mar. 18, 2015). 
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distortive effect of tax measures in the internal market led the 
Member States to agree to the Code of Conduct for Business 
Taxation,10 and the Commission to issue its Notice on the application 
of the State aid rules to measures relating to direct business taxation.11 
In line with its commitment made at the time to apply the State aid 
rules strictly in this field,12 the Commission examined a large number 
of national tax measures, including many of those identified as 
harmful by the Code of Conduct Group set up by the Member States.  
Nor is this the first time the Commission has examined tax 
rulings or transfer pricing from a State aid perspective. In 2003 it 
issued a number of decisions concerning tax schemes on transfer 
pricing involving individual rulings in favour of companies. One 
example is a Belgian tax ruling scheme for the foreign sales 
subsidiaries of US companies.13 The Commission considered that the 
application of a flat rate margin of 8% to a restricted set of costs did 
not represent a genuine assessment of the level of profit that an 
independent company could be expected to earn from comparable 
activities.  
The recently opened proceedings thus have a long pedigree. In 
the light of the attention they have provoked, it may be useful to 
understand how the State aid rules are to be applied in the field of 
taxation, and what their relevance may be in seeking to counter tax 
evasion and avoidance. While the function of State aid control is not, 
or at least not primarily, to ensure that tax is paid in the proper place, 
it has a contribution to make where a tax avoidance scheme of an 
undertaking depends in part on the cooperation of State authorities. 
The purpose of this Essay is to place in context the four investigations 
currently open in relation to tax rulings on transfer pricing and to 
explore the manner in which proceedings of this kind may serve to 
correct abuses in international taxation practice. 
                                                            
10. Council Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council Meeting on 1 December 1997 
concerning taxation policy, O.J. 1998 C 2/1 [hereinafter Council Conclusions]. 
11. Commission Notice, 1998 O.J. C 384/3. 
12. See Council Conclusions, supra note 10, at 5. 
13. See Commission Decision No. 2004/77/EC (Belgium – Tax ruling system for United 
States foreign sales corporations), 2004 O.J. L 23/14, ¶¶ 12-18, 47-48; see also Commission 
Decision No. 2003/438/EC (Luxembourg – Finance companies), 2003 O.J. L 153/40, ¶ 42; 
Commission Decision No. 2003/512/EC (Germany – control and coordination centres), 2003 
O.J. L 177/17, ¶ 26; Commission Decision No. 2004/76/EC (France – Headquarters and 
logistics centres), 2004 O.J. L 23/1, ¶¶ 7-9, 51-53.  
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I. BACKGROUND AND FACTS—WHAT ARE THESE CASES 
ABOUT? 
The function of tax rulings on transfer pricing—also called 
“advance pricing arrangements”—is to provide legal certainty to the 
undertakings concerned on the tax treatment of transfers of goods and 
services between companies which are members of the same 
corporate group—or in some cases between establishments of a single 
company in different countries.  
In very broad terms the taxable profit of a company is its total 
revenue—sales and other income—less the cost of obtaining that 
income. Among the costs to be deducted are amounts paid for goods 
and services purchased. Where a company buys goods or services 
from an unrelated seller, or borrows money from a bank, there is little 
scope for debate as to the reality of the expense. The same is true, on 
the profit side, where goods or services are supplied to an unrelated 
purchaser. But where transactions take place between companies 
under common control, the price of transactions can be manipulated 
in order to allow the group as a whole to lessen its tax burden, by 
shifting revenue to low-tax countries, and over-stating costs in high-
tax countries. Tax authorities and legislators are naturally aware of 
this risk, so tax legislation typically allows the authorities to correct 
the tax declarations of companies by substituting prices which 
correspond to those which would be charged under market conditions. 
The principle is also included in Article 9(1) of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention on Income and on Capital.14  
It is not solely transactions with related companies that pose 
problems of this kind. Essentially the same problem arises in the 
relations between a company and its permanent establishment in 
another country. The branch will normally be taxed in the State of 
                                                            
14. See OECD, Model Convention With Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, art. 
9(1) [hereinafter OECD Model]. The Model Convention states: 
 Where a) an enterprise of a Contracting State participates directly or indirectly in 
the management, control or capital of an enterprise of the other Contracting State, or 
 b) the same persons participate directly or indirectly in the management, control 
or capital of an enterprise of a Contracting State and an enterprise of the other 
Contracting State, and in either case conditions are made or imposed between the 
two enterprises in their commercial or financial relations which differ from those 
which would be made between independent enterprises, then any profits which 
would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by 
reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of 
that enterprise and taxed accordingly.  
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establishment as if it were an independent business entity.15 The 
branch may be required to maintain separate accounts in that State, in 
which case the pricing of transfers between the branch and the head 
office will be subject to scrutiny. If there are no separate accounts, a 
method must be found to identify the profits of the company that are 
attributable to its business activity in the country of the branch. 
Again, the guiding principle is the arm’s-length concept, the need to 
identify the level of profits that would be achieved under market 
conditions.16 
Depending on the types of transactions in question and the 
degree to which the company under examination operates on the 
market at all, the determination of prices equivalent to those which 
would prevail on the market—arm’s-length prices—may be a difficult 
exercise. The Transfer Pricing Guidelines17 drawn up by the OECD 
recognize five methods, of which three are regarded as traditional 
transaction methods and two are considered transactional profit 
methods:  
(1) Comparable uncontrolled price (“CUP”): the simplest and 
most intuitively satisfactory method compares the price charged 
between related companies with the price observed in 
comparable transactions between unrelated companies. 
(2) Resale price: here it is not the price but the gross margin that 
is compared. Where a product is bought from a related company 
and sold to an unrelated company, the arm’s-length price of the 
transaction between the related companies is arrived by 
subtracting from the resale price a margin corresponding to those 
realised in comparable transactions involving unrelated 
companies.  
                                                            
15. See id. at art. 7(2). Article 7(2) states: 
For the purposes of this Article . . . the profits that are attributable in each 
Contracting State to the permanent establishment referred to in paragraph 1 are the 
profits it might be expected to make, in particular in its dealings with other parts of 
the enterprise, if it were a separate and independent enterprise engaged in the same 
or similar activities under the same or similar conditions, taking into account the 
functions performed, assets used and risks assumed by the enterprise through the 
permanent establishment and through the other parts of the enterprise. 
16. Cf. OECD, 2010 REPORT ON THE ATTRIBUTION OF PROFITS TO PERMANENT 
ESTABLISHMENTS (July 22, 2010), available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pricing/
45689524.pdf. 
17. See OECD, TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 
AND TAX ADMINISTRATIONS (Aug. 18, 2010), available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-
pricing/transfer-pricing-guidelines.htm. The transfer pricing guidelines were first published in 
1995. 
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(3) Cost plus: again, a method based on margins but in the 
opposite direction. The arm’s-length price for an onward sale of 
goods or services to a related company is arrived at by adding an 
appropriate mark-up—reflecting the margin applied in 
comparable transactions between unrelated companies—to the 
costs incurred by the seller.  
(4) Transactional net margin method (“TNMM”): rather than the 
price of transactions, this method assesses the level of net profits. 
It takes an appropriate base such as costs, turnover or fixed 
investment and applies a profit ratio reflecting that observed in 
comparable uncontrolled transactions. 
(5) Transactional profit split: this method takes the combined 
profits of two related undertakings and divides them according to 
the resources used by the parties and their respective functions, 
taking into account, where possible, external data such as the 
division of profits in comparable joint ventures. 
The OECD guidelines are naturally not binding, but they 
represent the result of long discussion and a certain consensus on the 
most appropriate ways of estimating an arm’s length price or level of 
profit. They are thus a point of reference for national tax authorities in 
applying the arm’s-length principle, and they are explicitly mentioned 
in the legislation or administrative guidance of many Member 
States.18 They have also been taken as a basis for the Commission’s 
analysis in previous State aid cases.19 The guidelines do not, however, 
limit the freedom of action of taxpayers, which are normally free to 
propose a method which diverges from those recommended by the 
OECD if they consider—and can persuade the tax authorities—that 
their alternative method results in a robust approximation of an arm’s-
length price.  
The methods set out in the guidelines are not a smorgasbord 
from which businesses may pick according to their taste or 
convenience. Different methods are considered appropriate for 
                                                            
18. See, e.g., Taxation (International and Other Provisions) Act 2010, c. 8, § 164 (U.K.); 
Bulletin BOI-SJ-RES-20-10-20140218, Journal Officiel De La République Française [J.O.] 
[Official Gazette of France], 18 February 2014 (Fr.); Decree IFZ/2013/184M, 14 November 
2013 (Neth.). See generally Transfer Pricing Country Profiles, OECD (last updated June 6, 
2013), available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pricing/
transferpricingcountryprofiles.htm. 
19. In addition to the decisions cited in supra note 13, see, e.g., Commission Decision 
No. 2003/757/EC (Belgium – Aid Scheme) 2003 O.J. L 282/25 (upheld in Belgium and Forum 
187 v. Commission, Joined Cases C-182/03 & C-217/03, [2006] E.C.R. I-5479). 
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different situations and there is at least an informal hierarchy between 
them. The traditional transaction methods seek to ascertain a market 
price for each transaction or set of transactions, and the CUP is 
considered to provide the closest approximation of a market price. 
The profit methods, by contrast, estimate the profit that an 
independent company could be expected to make from a line of 
business or a business relationship. 
The guidelines form a significant part of the Commission’s 
reasoning in the opening decisions under discussion. In summary, the 
circumstances giving rise to those decisions are the following. 
A. Ireland—Apple 
Among tax planners, Ireland is well known as a base for the 
technique called “double Irish,” which exploits mismatches in the tax 
treatment of companies that are incorporated in Ireland but not 
resident there for tax purposes. This case concerns the tax treatment in 
Ireland itself of two companies (Apple Operations Europe, Apple 
Sales International) incorporated in Ireland but not tax resident there 
under Irish rules defining residence. 
Apple Operations Europe manufactures personal computers. It 
purchases components from related companies and sells the finished 
product to a related company. It also provides certain services for 
Apple group companies in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. In 
1991 it obtained from the Irish revenue authorities a ruling fixing its 
net profit at 65% of operating expenses up to an amount of US$60–70 
million20 and 20% of operating costs above that figure. A revised 
ruling issued in 2007 defined profits as a margin of 10–20% of 
operating costs together with a return on intellectual property of under 
10% of turnover. 
Apple Sales International purchases Apple brand goods from 
third-party manufacturers and sells them on to companies in the 
Apple group and other customers. A 1991 tax ruling set its net profit 
at 12.5% of branch operating costs. Under a revised ruling issued in 
2007 its profits are deemed to be 8–18% of branch operating costs. 
The Commission has expressed doubts. The 1991 rulings do not 
appear to have been based on any comparability analysis, but instead 
were the result of negotiation aimed at fixing a narrow range of 
taxable profits in Ireland. The method applied is a form of TNMM, 
                                                            
20. The precise figures are confidential. 
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but it is not clear why operating costs are used as the indicator rather 
than a broader measure such as costs of goods sold, nor indeed why 
costs are considered the appropriate indicator at all. The discrepancy 
between the two margins accepted in the 1991 ruling for Apple 
Operations Europe—65% versus 20%—is hard to explain as an 
arm’s-length calculation, and these figures appear to have been 
chosen for other reasons. The rulings include capital allowances fixed 
at a level for which the basis is unexplained. The 1991 rulings 
remained in force for an unusual length of time. The allocation of 
profits to the Irish branch of Apple Sales International takes no 
account of the increase in sales over the period following the 2007 
ruling.  
B. Luxembourg—FFT  
The identification of the beneficiary as Fiat Financing and Trade 
Ltd. is a deduction from the data available. Luxembourg offered 
limited cooperation during the initial stages of the procedure and 
refused to identify the company, citing secrecy concerns. 
Fiat Financing and Trade (“FFT”) is a Fiat subsidiary with its 
head office in Luxembourg and branches in London and Madrid. It 
performs central treasury and financing functions for the Fiat Group’s 
operations in Europe—outside Italy—and is the immediate parent 
company of Fiat Financing North America (“FFNA”) and Fiat 
Financing Canada (“FFC”).  
In autumn 2012, it obtained from the Luxembourg authorities an 
advance pricing arrangement valid for a period of three years based 
on a transfer pricing analysis carried out by FFT’s tax advisers. That 
analysis presented a TNMM calculation based on the application of a 
fixed rate of return to a portion of the company’s equity, resulting in a 
tax base (taxable income) of some EU€2.5 billion ± EU€10 million in 
each of the years covered by the tax ruling. The rate of return was 
based on a comparison with publicly available information on a 
selection of companies operating independently in the financial 
sector. That rate of return (6.05%) was applied to the portion of equity 
supposed to correspond to the minimum capital required of financial 
institutions by the Basel II criteria.21 The capital corresponding to the 
                                                            
21. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, BASEL II: INTERNATIONAL 
CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED 
FRAMEWORK (June 2006), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.htm.  
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equity holdings in FFNA and FFC was left out of account, and the 
remainder, designated “excess capital” was considered to be 
remunerated at a rate corresponding to short-term interest rates 
(0.8%).  
In the opening decision the Commission identified a number of 
points of concern. First, the procedure followed appeared to entail 
considerable discretion for the tax authorities, in itself a potential 
source of exceptional treatment. It was questionable whether the 
retention of a fixed tax base for the duration of the tax ruling could be 
thought to reflect arm’s-length conditions since it did not allow for 
variations in performance. Methods other than TNMM seemed likely 
to produce a more reliable result since external points of reference for 
at least some of the financial activities carried on could be used in a 
CUP analysis. The rate of return appeared excessively low, as did the 
portion of equity capital taken as the base for the calculation. 
C. Luxembourg—Amazon  
Amazon has a number of subsidiaries in Luxembourg, most of 
them members of a fiscal unit headed by Amazon EU Sàrl, a limited 
company incorporated and resident there. These companies carry on 
the retail and other business activities of the Amazon group in 
Europe, notably through retail websites. In particular, Amazon EU 
Sàrl owns the inventory and earns the profits arising from retail 
sales.22 Amazon EU Sàrl is owned by Amazon Europe Technologies 
Holding SCS, a Luxembourg limited partnership which also licenses 
intellectual property to Amazon EU Sàrl. The limited partnership is 
transparent for tax purposes; its income is taxable only in the hands of 
the partners, three US companies which are neither resident in 
Luxembourg nor have a permanent establishment there. It is thus not 
liable for corporation tax or income tax in Luxembourg. 
In November 2003, the Luxembourg tax authorities issued a 
ruling agreeing to the tax treatment of Amazon EU Sàrl proposed by 
its tax adviser. That ruling has been in force ever since. In essence it 
fixes the return to Amazon EU Sàrl at the lesser of 4–6%23 of its total 
operating expenses and the total EU operating profits of the Amazon 
                                                            
22. See Amazon’s evidence given to the House of Commons Public Accounts 
Committee, Report on HMRC’s 2011-2012 Accounts, 2012-13, H.C. (U.K.), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmpubacc/writev/716/m03.htm.  
23. The precise figure is confidential. 
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websites, subject to a floor and a ceiling of 0.45% and 0.55% of 
Amazon’s net EU sales revenue. The amount in excess of that is 
stated to be the royalty payable to Amazon Europe Technologies 
Holding SCS for the use of its intellectual property—hence a 
deductible expense. 
The Commission’s decision of October 7, 2014 raises a number 
of issues. There is no indication that Amazon’s request was 
accompanied by a comparability report, and the request was granted 
in an unusually short time—11 working days—casting doubt on the 
assessment carried out. The calculation used does not appear to 
correspond to any of the OECD-approved methods. The royalty is not 
a function of output, sales, or profits, but is calculated as the residual 
profit above a certain fixed level. The profit margin of between 4% 
and 6% seems low, and the cap on profit represented by the figure of 
0.55% of net turnover reinforces that perception. Finally, it is unusual 
that a transfer price ruling should be valid for more than a few years 
at a time without revision. 
D. Netherlands—Starbucks 
Two subsidiaries of the Starbucks group resident in the 
Netherlands are responsible for a range of group activities in Europe, 
the Middle East, and Africa. Both companies are beneficiaries of tax 
rulings issued by the Netherlands authorities but only one of these 
rulings is the object of the procedure. 
Starbucks Manufacturing BV, a company resident in the 
Netherlands, is responsible for roasting the coffee used in Starbucks 
outlets in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. It buys the coffee 
beans from a related company and pays another related entity—a UK 
limited partnership—a royalty for the use of intellectual property. In 
2008 it obtained a tax ruling from the Netherlands tax authorities 
fixing its remuneration as a mark-up of 9–12%24 on a defined cost 
base. The ruling applies the TNMM method on the basis of a report 
submitted by Starbucks Manufacturing’s tax adviser. The 
Commission’s doubts are the following: It is not clear that Starbucks 
Manufacturing is properly to be regarded as a low-risk toll 
manufacturer so as to justify the low margin applied; the cost base 
appears to be defined too narrowly since certain items of cost are 
excluded; and the calculation of the royalty is suspect since it is 
                                                            
24. The precise figure is confidential. 
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calculated as a residual profit without regard to any of the normal 
bases of calculation of royalties at arm’s-length. 
II. THE PROCEDURE—WHAT IS THE FUNCTION OF THESE 
DECISIONS? 
The four decisions under discussion represent the second phase 
in the State aid procedure, the opening of the formal investigation.25 
The Commission may at any time, following a complaint or on its 
own initiative, examine possible unlawful aid—measures which 
constitute aid but have not been notified to it in accordance with 
Article 108(3) TFEU. After an initial examination it may decide that 
the measure does not constitute aid or that it is compatible with the 
internal market. If it has doubts, it must initiate proceedings—that is, 
carry out a formal investigation. The decision opening the procedure 
must include a preliminary assessment of the existence of aid and 
indicate any doubts as to the compatibility of the aid with the internal 
market. The Member State concerned and any interested parties—for 
example, the beneficiaries of the measure and their competitors—are 
invited to comment. The Commission may also request information 
from other sources.26 
Once it has heard the views of interested parties and obtained the 
information it thinks necessary, the Commission will adopt a final 
decision. That decision may find that the measure under examination 
is not aid, is aid compatible with the internal market—possibly 
subject to conditions, or is unlawful aid.27 In the case of unlawful aid, 
the Commission must require the Member State to recover the aid 
from the beneficiary, unless recovery would be contrary to general 
principles of EU law or the prescription period of ten years has 
elapsed.28 For that purpose it must either identify the amount of the 
aid to be recovered or provide the Member State with the criteria 
                                                            
25. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
art. 108(2), 2008 O.J. C 115/47, at 92 [hereinafter TFEU]; see also Council Regulation No. 
659/1999 on laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the 
functioning of the European Union, 1999 O.J. L 83/1, art. 6 [hereinafter Procedural 
Regulation]. 
26. See Procedural Regulation, supra note 25, arts. 4(2), 4(3), 4(4), 6(a), in conjunction 
with id. art. 13(1). 
27. Id. art. 7, again in conjunction with id. art. 13(1), . 
28. Id. arts. 14, 15. 
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necessary for the latter to calculate the amount of that aid.29 The 
Member State is required to take all measures necessary for recovery 
of the aid.30 
III. THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK—WHAT IS FISCAL STATE 
AID?  
Article 107(1) of the TFEU forbids “aid granted by a Member 
State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which 
distorts or threatens to distort competition by favoring certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods.” 
It is well established that State aid has four elements: (1) there 
must be an advantage; (2) that advantage must be selective; (3) it 
must be provided from State resources; and (4) it must have an 
impact—at least potential—on competition and on trade between 
Member States. The crucial issue in fiscal State aid is material 
selectivity, the demonstration that certain undertakings enjoy an 
advantage that is not normally available.  
State aid is the provision by the State of financial assistance to a 
business entity. The most apparent form of financial assistance is 
naturally a cash subsidy, but it can manifest itself in any form of 
transfer. In particular it can consist in what is sometimes called tax 
expenditure, waiving payment of a tax or other charge that would 
normally be payable. 
As the Court of Justice put it in one of its earliest judgments on 
the subject:31  
The concept of aid is . . . wider than that of a subsidy because it 
embraces not only positive benefits, such as subsidies 
themselves, but also interventions which, in various forms, 
mitigate the charges which are normally included in the budget of 
an undertaking and which, without, therefore, being subsidies in 
the strict meaning of the word, are similar in character and have 
the same effect. 
                                                            
29. Spain v. Commission, Case C-480/98, [2000] E.C.R. I-8717, ¶ 25. See generally 
Commission Notice, 2007 O.J. C 272/05 [hereinafter Effective Implementation of Commission 
Decisions]. 
30. See, e.g., Mediaset SpA v. Ministero dello Sviluppo economico, Case C-69/13, 
[2014] (Judgment delivered February 13, 2014), ¶ 23. 
31. Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg v. High Authority, Case C-30/59, 
[1961] E.C.R. 1. 
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Aspects of this statement continue to be recycled in fiscal aid cases 
today.32 It is in essence a statement of common sense: there is no 
difference between receiving a sum of money and being dispensed 
from payment of a sum of money that would normally be payable. 
The same idea is found in the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures. There, the definition of a subsidy includes a 
situation where “government revenue that is otherwise due is forgone 
or not collected (e.g., fiscal incentives such as tax credits).”33 
The critical element in those definitions is the word “normally” 
in “normally payable” or “normally included in the budget.” It 
highlights the difficulty of identifying fiscal aid, a more complicated 
task than identifying a subsidy: first it is necessary to determine the 
point of comparison. 
The most straightforward way of doing that is to identify the 
generally applicable rule in relation to the tax concerned. Any 
deviation from that rule may then be considered—at least prima 
facie—to be an alleviation of a financial burden that would otherwise 
be borne by the taxpayer, and hence to be State aid. That is the 
approach that has been taken by the Commission in the vast majority 
of cases and has been confirmed by the Court of Justice.34 It has the 
virtue of simplicity and clarity, and it is usually satisfactory for 
systems of tax whose main purpose is revenue generation, such as 
corporation tax or value added tax—although there are cases where it 
breaks down: see Joined Cases C-106 and 107/09 Gibraltar, 
discussed below.  
An early example of this approach in the case law is Case 173/73 
Italy v. Commission,35 which also lays down other essential principles 
such as the idea that Article 107 is not concerned with the cause, or 
the aim, or the type of measure, but with its effects. 
                                                            
32. See, e.g., Adria-Wien Pipeline GmbH v. Finanzlandesdirektion für Kärnten, Case C-
143/99 [2001] E.C.R. I-8365, ¶ 38; Commission v. Gibraltar, Joined Cases C-106/09 & C-
107/09, [2011] E.C.R. I-11113, ¶ 71. 
33.  Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, THE LEGAL TEXTS: 
THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE 
NEGOTIATIONS 231 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 14., art. 1.1(a)(1)(ii). 
34. See Commission Notice, 1998 O.J. C 384/3, ¶ 16 [hereinafter Direct Business 
Taxation] (a draft notice on the notion of State aid is currently under discussion and may be 
seen on the website of the Commission’s Directorate General for Competition); Italy v. 
Commission, Case C-66/02, [2005] E.C.R. I-10901, ¶ 100; Forum 187, Joined Cases C-182/03 
& C-217/03, [2003] E.C.R. I-6887, ¶¶ 119-20. 
35. Italy v. Commission, Case 173/73, [1974] E.C.R. 709. 
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13 The aim of Article 92 [now, 107] is to prevent trade between 
Member States from being affected by benefits granted by the 
public authorities which, in various forms, distort or threaten to 
distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the 
production of certain goods. 
Accordingly, Article 92 does not distinguish between the 
measures of State intervention concerned by reference to their 
causes or aims but defines them in relation to their effects. 
Consequently, the alleged fiscal nature or social aim of the 
measure in issue cannot suffice to shield it from the application 
of Article 92.36 
This case concerned a scheme under which employers in the textiles 
sector paid a reduced rate of social security contributions. Italy argued 
that the scheme was appropriate for two reasons: first, the sector was 
characterised by a high proportion of female labour—since workers 
were not heads of household they were not eligible for family 
allowances. Secondly, the industry was particularly open to foreign 
competition, and contributions were lower in other Member States. 
According to the Court of Justice, the first argument was irrelevant 
and the second simply emphasised the fact that the scheme constituted 
State aid. 
That approach may not always be appropriate, since the function 
of taxation is not solely revenue generation. Taxation is frequently 
used as an instrument of behaviour modification or as a Pigouvian 
tool, used to correct what is regarded as an instance of market 
failure—for example, carbon taxation insofar as it attempts to deal 
with environment-related externalities.  
Where taxation has a regulatory function, a definition of 
“normal” in terms of the tax measure itself is less satisfactory. It is 
arguable that the very fact that some people are taxed under that 
measure and others are not already incorporates preferential treatment 
of certain businesses. Indeed, it could be said that as soon as tax is 
used for anything other than revenue-gathering there is scope for a 
State aid analysis, since any attempt to modify economic incentives 
by means of taxation may imply State aid to some category of 
economic operators. Taken to its logical extreme, that could lead to 
extensive intervention of State aid control in the economic policy of 
Member States, perhaps in circumstances where that policy is 
                                                            
36. Id. ¶ 13. 
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essentially neutral in its effect. It is not clear just to what extent the 
scope and purpose of the State aid provisions of the Treaty justify 
such intervention. However, these issues do not arise in the present 
discussion, which relates to possible divergence from the norm in the 
application of a revenue-gathering tax. 
Under the approach typically applied by the Commission and by 
the Court of Justice, the identification of a derogation or a departure 
from the normal scheme of taxation raises three issues: the existence 
of an advantage, the selective character of that advantage, and 
consistency with the nature and logic of the system. An advantage lies 
in relief from a tax charge that is normally borne. Examples given in 
the 1998 Commission Notice include a reduction in the tax base 
(deductions, accelerated depreciation), a reduction in the amount of 
tax (exemption or credit), or special payment modalities (deferment). 
These examples show that the notion of an advantage is already a 
relative concept, since it represents a departure from something that is 
“normal.”37 There is thus considerable overlap with the notion of 
selectivity. 
This first issue is merely a gateway: there would be no debate if 
there were no advantage. The core idea of a derogation is found in the 
next issue, selectivity. According to the Court of Justice it is 
necessary to assess whether, under a particular statutory scheme, a 
State measure is such as to “favour certain undertakings or the 
production of certain goods” in comparison with other undertakings 
which, in the light of the objective of the system, are in a comparable 
legal and factual situation. By contrast, measures which apply in the 
same manner to all economic operators are in principle general 
measures. The Commission Notice adds the rider that such measures 
must not be de facto confined to certain firms. Member States remain 
free to decide on their economic policy and to distribute the tax 
burden as they see fit over different factors of production.  
What that typically means in practice is a three-step process: 
1. Determine the system of reference 
2. Identify a measure or a rule which represents a departure from 
that system, by giving more favorable treatment to some 
undertakings than to others. That leads to a conclusion of prima 
facie selectivity. 
                                                            
37. See, e.g., Commission v. Portugal, Case C-88/03, [2006] E.C.R. I-7115, ¶ 56. 
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3. Then check whether this prima facie selectivity can be 
justified by the logic of the tax system (its nature or general 
scheme). 
According to the Court, “the concept of State aid does not refer 
to State measures which differentiate between undertakings and 
which are, therefore, prima facie selective where that differentiation 
arises from the nature or the overall structure of the system of which 
they form part.”38 In that statement there is an echo of the Court’s 
reasoning in its case law on the application of the Treaty freedoms in 
the tax field, and that should be no surprise—in both contexts, what is 
at issue is fundamentally a question of discrimination. 
In relation to a general tax such as income tax or corporation tax, 
the first step is to take the tax itself as the system of reference. A 
derogation from the system is a difference in treatment which does 
not correspond to a relevant difference between taxpayers, having 
regard to the objective of the tax. Such a derogation amounts prima 
facie to a selective advantage, but it is still necessary to determine 
whether there is an explanation for the derogation in the logic of the 
system. 
One example might be a progressive income tax. The system of 
reference is the income tax. The objective of this system of reference 
is to tax income. Low income earners and high income earners are in 
a comparable situation in the light of this objective. Therefore, the 
progressive rates grant an advantage to low income earners. There is 
prima facie selectivity. However, the Member State can show that this 
selectivity is justified by a guiding principle of its tax system, namely 
the principles of redistribution and taxation according to the ability to 
pay.39  
The concept of the nature or general scheme of the system is one 
that does not appear in the Treaty. It serves to ensure that regard is 
properly had to the internal logic of the tax system even where a 
difference in treatment suggests at first sight a derogation. 
Consistency with this internal logic demonstrates that a provision is 
general in nature and aimed at ensuring true equality of treatment for 
taxpayers, not providing a special favor for some. Thus the adaptation 
of tax provisions to take into account the particular features of a 
category of taxpayers such as financial institutions—for example, 
                                                            
38. Id. ¶ 52. 
39. Cf. Territorio Histórico de Álava v. Commission, Joined Cases T-92/00 & T-103/00, 
[2002] E.C.R. II-1385, ¶ 60. 
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through recognition of reserve requirements—does not necessarily 
represent a special measure in favour of that category.40  
This concept has been created in the case-law and has not always 
been used with the greatest clarity. In particular, it is not always clear 
whether the Court has in mind the nature or general scheme of the tax 
system as a whole, the particular tax in issue, the particular tax regime 
in issue or indeed the nature or general scheme of any system, 
whether fiscal or not.  
One may ask what justification there is for the separate treatment 
of these second and third stages. After all, they amount to answering 
the discrimination question twice over. That is why it is not wholly 
unjustifiable to suggest that there is no real distinction between the 
two stages. First of all, however, there is some utility in distinguishing 
between the fundamental objective of the tax system and other, 
secondary considerations that have a role to play. Secondly, there is 
an important procedural aspect. According to established case law,41 
at the third stage it is for the Member State to demonstrate that the 
apparent discrimination, the prima facie selectivity, in reality reflects 
the logic of the tax system as a whole. In that respect the Court 
distinguishes objectives which are extrinsic to the tax system from the 
mechanisms which are inherent in the tax system and are necessary 
for the achievement of its objectives. 
One example of the application of this process may be seen in 
Joined Cases T-92/00 and T-103/00 Territorio Histórico de Álava.42 
That judgment concerned part of a complicated case which had tax 
and non-tax aspects.43 One tax aspect was a tax credit for large 
investments which entailed some discretion for the tax authorities. 
The Province of Alava argued that this tax credit did not constitute aid 
since it was a general measure applicable to all investments of an 
amount in excess of 2.5 billion pesetas—roughly EU€15 million. 
Moreover, it was consistent with the nature and scheme of the tax 
system since it was based on objective criteria applicable to all 
economic operators that fulfilled them. 
                                                            
40. Cf. Italy, [2005], E.C.R. I-10901, ¶ 101. 
41. Portugal, [2006] E.C.R. I-7115, ¶ 81. 
42. Territorio Histórico de Álava, [2002] E.C.R. II-1385; upheld by the Court of Justice, 
Case C-186/02, [2004] ECR I-10653. 
43. Commission Decision No. 2000/795/EC (Ramondín SA and Ramondín Cápsulas 
SA), 2000 O.J. L 318/36.  
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The Court of First Instance reiterated established case law to the 
effect that a measure is selective when the administration has 
discretion in the application of the measure and can therefore make 
more or less arbitrary distinctions among candidates. The measure 
was also de facto selective because of the minimum investment 
requirement: the benefit was reserved for companies with deep 
pockets. In response to the argument on the nature and scheme of the 
tax system the Court considered that if anything, the measure was 
contrary to the scheme of the tax system since it provided a benefit 
only for those with most resources. The further argument raised by 
the Province of Alava that the measure promoted the economic 
development of the Basque Country was irrelevant to the issue of 
selectivity since it referred to a matter extraneous to the tax system—
this argument would naturally be relevant to the question whether the 
aid was compatible with the common market. 
Two remarks should be made in relation to the first and second 
steps in the process. First, in determining the reference system it may 
not always be clear what is the rule and what is the exception. An 
example of that dilemma may be seen in Case C-6/12 P.44 The 
relevant national law allowed companies to carry forward losses to 
subsequent tax periods. It also permitted the transfer of losses 
between members of a corporate group. However, in order to prevent 
what was regarded as undesirable “loss trafficking”—the purchase of 
a loss-making company for the purpose of setting off its losses against 
the profits of the purchaser—the legislature prohibited the further use 
of losses following the sale of a company. That was then found to be 
an excessive response because it prevented the subsequent use of 
losses in many cases where there was no reason to suspect abuse—for 
example, the start-up losses of a new company which was taken over 
by a new investor. In order to correct that problem a new rule was 
enacted in order to allow some cases through the net. However, the 
new rule was not clearly formulated and left considerable discretion 
to the tax authorities. Administrative guidance indicated that aspects 
such as employment were to be taken into account. 
In the P case the Court criticized the excessive discretion 
enjoyed by the tax authorities and the reference to extrinsic 
objectives. It accepted, however, that an authorization system 
                                                            
44. P, Case C-6/12, [2013], (delivered July 18, 2013); cf. Commission Decision No. 
2011/527/EU (Sanierungsklausel), 2011 O.J. L 235/26. 
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permitting tax carry-forward only in certain cases was permissible 
where it was based on the application of objective criteria aimed at 
preventing trade in losses—paragraph 26 of the judgment. More 
generally it may be considered that in circumstances of this kind, 
what is important is consistency. In a case such as P, there can be no 
objection from the State aid perspective if it is shown that the rule 
distinguishes between abusive and non-abusive conduct, between real 
economic activity and loss-trafficking. The question, what is the rule 
and what the exception is in reality of no importance. Such an issue is 
best dealt with in an analysis of the nature and logic of the system; 
that underlines the conceptual utility of this third step as a safeguard 
against mechanical reasoning. 
Secondly, the reference, as a point of comparison, to “companies 
in the same situation” is a dangerous one, for the question is, same 
situation in relation to what? In principle the comparison should be 
made with companies which are in the same situation with regard to 
the logic of the tax system, which means that this is just another way 
of describing the three-stage process. However, it is all too easy, 
through this ostensibly innocuous phrase, to introduce extraneous 
criteria. For example, Joined Cases C-78/08 to C-80/08 Paint 
Graphos45 concerned a special corporation tax regime (exemption 
from tax) for producers’ and workers’ cooperative associations. That 
was clearly a departure from normal system, and the Court thus dealt 
quickly with the first two steps in the reasoning (selective advantage). 
It then addressed the criterion of comparability as a separate issue, 
saying that cooperatives are different from other economic operators 
because of the special principles under which they operate: they are 
managed not in the interest of investors but in that of their members; 
their shares are not listed and are not easily transferable; they carry on 
business for the mutual benefit of members; and they typically have a 
lower profit margin. The Court thus concluded in paragraph 61 of the 
judgment that cooperatives were not in a comparable factual and legal 
situation to that of commercial companies.  
That does not seem a sound approach, for none of these elements 
has any obvious relevance to the functioning of the corporation tax 
system. As the Court went on to observe in paragraphs 69–70 of the 
judgment, objectives of exemption which are extrinsic to the tax 
                                                            
45. Paint Graphos v. Franchetto, Joined Cases C-78/08 & C-80/08, [2011] E.C.R. I-
7611. 
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system are irrelevant and thus cannot preclude the application of 
Article 107. The real issue has to do with the nature and logic of the 
tax system. A cooperative of the kind in question is a group of 
persons who share infrastructure and facilities, working together but 
in their own individual interests and sharing the proceeds. It is 
entirely consistent with the corporation tax system to treat such an 
entity—despite the fact that it has legal personality—as transparent 
for tax purposes, in the same way as a partnership. Costs are shared, 
revenue is shared, and the profit is taxed in the hands of the workers 
or producers. And the Court appears to accept that view in paragraph 
71 of the judgment. 
More usually, as for example in Case C-143/99 Adria-Wien,46 
the Court speaks in paragraph 41 of companies which “are 
comparable in the light of the objective pursued by the measure in 
question.” That is not very precise language, and potentially 
misleading. If the “measure in question” is taken literally to mean the 
particular rule under examination, then nothing is State aid, for all 
taxpayers which benefit from the measure are treated equally. The 
point of comparison must in the first place be the objective of the 
reference system—taxation of income; taxation of the use of energy, 
and so on. Thus a better formulation is that used in judgments such as 
Case C-522/13 Navantia,47 at paragraph 35: “in the light of the 
objective attributed to the tax system of the Member State 
concerned.” 
These remarks reinforce the over-riding importance of the third 
step, the nature and general scheme of the system, and show that in 
reality there is no clear division between the various aspects of the 
debate. The ultimate question is always: does this rule make sense in 
terms of this tax or of the tax system as a whole? That in turn 
underlines the need to identify the system to be taken into account. 
Normally this will be the reference system, but it may at times be 
necessary to have regard to a wider context. The notion of “the 
scheme of taxation” may have to be defined quite broadly, as the 
following example shows.  
                                                            
46. Adria-Wien Pipeline, [2001] E.C.R. I-8365, ¶ 41. 
47. Navantia v. Concello de Ferrol, Case C-522/13, [2014], (Judgment delivered Oct. 9, 
2014). 
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Case C-308/01 GIL Insurance48 presented a curious situation. 
The value-added tax legislation of the European Union should in 
principle apply to all goods and services, but a certain number of 
services, including insurance, are exempt from value-added tax 
(“VAT”) because it was not possible, when the legislation was being 
drafted, to find agreement on an appropriate way of calculating the 
basis of assessment.49 That is understandable, for it is hard to say just 
what the price of an insurance service is. It is surely not the amount of 
the premium, because the largest part of that is a contribution to a 
common fund set aside to cover risks, and does not represent payment 
for a service.  
Tax advisers in the United Kingdom exploited this exemption by 
developing a tax avoidance scheme: companies selling large 
consumer goods on instalment plans would offer extended guarantees 
worded as insurance policies. Had these been expressed as normal 
service contracts they would have been subject to VAT at the 
standard rate of 17.5%; presented as insurance, they were subject to 
the separate tax on insurance contracts at a much lower rate, 2.5%. 
The United Kingdom sought to close the loophole by applying a 
special high rate of insurance tax—by no coincidence 17.5%—to the 
contracts in question. That measure was challenged on the ground that 
it constituted State aid to other insurance companies—those paying 
the normal rate. The Court dismissed that claim, holding that the 
higher rate should be seen in a broad context encompassing not only 
the insurance tax but also VAT, for which the insurance tax was a 
substitute. The difference in taxation was thus justified by the nature 
and general scheme of the system, the latter being understood in a 
broad sense. 
The three-step model breaks down however in the face of a 
general tax scheme which is inherently discriminatory, and a striking 
example of that is Joined Cases C-106/09 and C-107/09 Commission 
v. Gibraltar. For many years Gibraltar had a normal profits-based 
company tax under which the “offshore economy” enjoyed effective 
exemption. That system was considered by the Commission to entail 
State aid. Gibraltar proposed to introduce a new system which 
                                                            
48. GIL Insurance v. Commissioners of Customs and Excise, Case C-308/01, [2004] 
E.C.R. I-4777. 
49. There are in fact two categories of exempt transactions: financial services and 
insurance, exempted for the reason given, and certain other services which are exempted for 
reasons of public interest. 
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consisted in a combination of payroll tax and tax on occupation of 
business property, with a cap of 15% of income and additional 
payments for certain types of companies. In essence, it reverse 
engineered its previous system so as to duplicate its effect in what 
was ostensibly a single system with no special or exceptional regime.  
In a 2005 decision50 the Commission considered that this “single 
system” was in fact a combination of different and mutually 
incompatible taxation schemes, so that it was impossible to identify a 
reference system and then to discern a “special regime.” The scheme 
as a whole incorporated differentiation between categories of 
companies in such a way as to provide benefits for some of them, in 
particular offshore companies. The effects of the scheme were clear: 
the grant of effective tax exemption to certain categories of 
companies, in particular those active in the offshore economy—so-
called brass plate companies. Indeed, the result of the new system was 
that there were various tax regimes. Off-shore companies were in 
general subject only to the payroll tax and thus continued to be 
exempt, with the exception of those active in the financial sector, 
which became subject to tax in the amount of about 5%. Companies 
which actually operated in Gibraltar were subject to tax with a 
maximum of 15% of profits—so there was essentially a 15% 
company tax. Companies referred to as utilities—what one might call 
immobile cash cows—continued to be subject to tax at a rate of 35% 
of their profits, the standard rate of company tax under the previous 
system.  
The Court of First Instance quashed the Commission’s decision 
on the ground that it had failed to identify a tax regime which gave a 
special advantage to a certain category of companies.51 The Court 
applied the standard approach described above and noted that the 
Commission had not demonstrated the existence of any departure 
from a normally applicable set of tax rules. On appeal, the Court of 
Justice52 held that the combination of a tax based on payroll—with a 
threshold depending on profits—and a tax on the occupation of 
business property was neutral in nature and thus not selective. 
                                                            
50. Commission Decision No. 2005/261/EC of 30 March 2004 (Gibraltar Corporation 
Tax Reform), 2005 O.J. L 85/1. 
51. See Gibraltar v. Commission, Joined Cases T-211/04 & T-215/04, [2008] E.C.R. 
II-3745. 
52. See Commission v. Gibraltar, Joined Cases C-106/09 & C-107/09, [2011] E.C.R. I-
11113. 
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However, the Commission’s failure to obey the standard approach 
was not necessarily a fatal error. Selectivity can be found in a 
comparison of the tax burden on different undertakings, the reference 
framework being the tax system as a whole. A strict requirement to 
demonstrate a departure from a “normal” regime would leave a 
loophole which could be exploited. The proposed Gibraltar system 
would result in de facto discrimination between companies in a 
comparable situation having regard to the objective of a general tax 
system for all companies. While differences in the tax burden are not 
in themselves sufficient to demonstrate selectivity, here the 
exemption of offshore companies was not a random consequence of a 
dispassionate regime but the desired outcome. 
That conclusion is open to criticism insofar as it seems to be 
based on the purpose rather than the effect of the scheme—although it 
is well established that a finding of State aid depends not on the 
objectives of a measure but on its effects.53 There is also a hint of the 
circular in its definition of the basis of comparison. Opponents of the 
standard approach who think that the analysis should always be based 
on comparability of the situations of taxpayers no doubt welcomed 
the Gibraltar judgment. The standard approach nevertheless has its 
merits and should be retained unless a robust and reasonably 
predictable alternative can be found. More general application of the 
Court’s approach in Gibraltar would be problematic: it would require 
careful determination of the basis of comparison and an assessment of 
the legitimacy of differentiation. In other words, it would require 
potentially far-reaching intrusion in the tax policy of Member States. 
It seems preferable to accept that the Gibraltar judgment should be 
confined to a limited range of situations where the standard approach 
breaks down because it is deliberately subverted. 
As a final point, it should be recalled that while this discussion 
has focused on the existence of aid, that is not the end of the debate in 
a State aid case. Not all aid is considered undesirable; there is “bad” 
aid and “good” aid. The latter can be authorized under Article 107(2) 
and (3) TFEU as compatible with the common market, after 
examination by the Commission. 
                                                            
53. See, e.g., France Télécom v. Commission, Case C-81/10, [2011] E.C.R. I-12899, ¶ 
17. 
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IV. TAX RULINGS AS STATE AID—HOW SHOULD THEY BE 
TREATED FROM THE STATE AID PERSPECTIVE?  
In the light of the foregoing discussion it is clear that advance 
pricing arrangements, like other measures that fix the obligations of 
taxpayers, are capable of constituting State aid. The question is, in 
what circumstances and under what conditions? It should be 
emphasized first of all that the mere existence of an advance tax 
ruling, of a system for granting tax rulings, or of legislation that 
envisages tax rulings, is entirely neutral from a State aid perspective. 
The function of a tax ruling is in principle to apply the general rules to 
a particular case, but doing so in advance rather than after the fact and 
for a more or less prolonged period rather than a single tax year. In 
this respect there is no difference between a tax ruling given in 
advance and an individual decision taken after the fact on the taxable 
income of a taxpayer in a given year. What is important is whether the 
ruling departs from the normal system of taxation. Only then can 
there be State aid.  
In order to determine whether a ruling entails aid, it is necessary 
and sufficient to apply the principles set out above. In relation to 
rulings on transfer pricing—advance pricing arrangements—the 
identification of the reference system seems straightforward. It is 
quite simply the taxation of independent companies. They are taxed 
on their revenue less costs, both sides of the equation being fixed by 
the market. For related companies the answer is no different: they are 
taxed on revenue less costs, and on both sides the elements that are 
not fixed by the market must be verified and where necessary 
substituted by a price that corresponds to the price that would be 
charged in a market transaction. That surrogate for market prices is an 
arm’s-length price which must be arrived at by a uniform and 
defendable method.  
That method, or range of acceptable methods, may be laid down 
in national legislation. In theory the choice of a method by a Member 
State is open to State aid scrutiny. A method which was not directed 
at determining an arm’s-length price or one whose systematic result 
was a price which could not truly be regarded as an approximation of 
a market price could amount to State aid in so far as it had the effect 
of diminishing the amount of tax payable by companies forming part 
on multi-national groups. The sole obstacle to such an analysis (in so 
far as the method was treated as a tax scheme) would be the reasoning 
deployed in the recent judgments of the General Court in Case T-
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219/10 Autogrill España v. Commission and Case T-399/11 Banco 
Santander v. Commission,54 according to which the concept of 
selectivity requires the identification of a category of undertakings 
defined by sector or by the nature of their economic activity.55  
Equally unacceptable, for obvious reasons, is a system under 
which the assessment is a matter for the unfettered discretion of the 
tax authorities. Such a system would offend against established case 
law according to which State aid exists where the competent authority 
has latitude to choose beneficiaries or the conditions under which an 
advantage is granted.56 Decisions of the tax authorities must be based 
on an assessment of objective criteria stemming from the logic of the 
tax system.57 By contrast, a system which is based on generally 
accepted methods such as the OECD Guidelines, or any alternative 
method which is used to calculate an arm’s-length price, is not in 
itself open to objection. Attention must then shift to individual rulings 
applying a legitimate method.  
Here matters become more difficult. From a theoretical 
perspective it can be said that where the tax authorities apply a 
transfer-pricing method in such a manner as to procure an undue 
advantage to an undertaking—for example by using a restricted set of 
costs in a cost-plus method, or using an inappropriate profit indicator 
in the context of the TNMM—the result is State aid. The choice of 
methods itself is not immune from scrutiny; for example, the use of 
the profit-split method may be considered inappropriate in respect of 
a company which performs simple transactions for which there is an 
easily available external comparator. From a policy perspective, 
however, review of individual decisions represents an intrusion into 
the freedom of action and of assessment of national tax authorities, 
and is not a step to be taken without strong grounds.  
Indeed in sheer practical terms the task is hazardous, for it is 
likely to be only in extreme cases that one can with confidence say 
that a particular decision reflects a misapplication of the chosen 
method or that it does not truly determine an arm’s-length price. The 
                                                            
54. Judgments of 7 November 2014, currently under appeal (cases C-20/15 and C-21/15 
respectively). Since the Author is one of the Commission’s agents (counsel) in these cases they 
will not be discussed here. 
55. (T-219/10, ¶¶ 34-62; T-399/11, ¶¶ 38-66) 
56. See France v. Commission, Case C-241/94, [1996] E.C.R. I-4551, ¶¶ 23-24. 
57. See P, [2013] (delivered July 18, 2013), ¶ 26; see also Commission Notice, Direct 
Business Taxation, footnote 34 supra, ¶¶ 21-22. 
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application of the methods sanctified by the OECD Guidelines is not 
an exact science and leaves wide scope for the exercise of considered 
judgment by the tax administration. Even the CUP method, which is 
generally considered to deliver the most accurate and defendable 
approximation of market prices, can entail adjustments intended to 
take into account aspects which distinguish intra-group transactions 
from market transactions—a comparability analysis may take into 
account for example the allocation of risk or the performance of 
functions which do not form part of similar uncontrolled transactions. 
Methods which entail reference to average values for comparable 
uncontrolled margins leave scope for even greater uncertainty.  
It will be difficult to judge what is State aid and what is a 
justifiable approximation of an arm’s-length price—or in relation to 
other types of tax ruling, a bona fide assessment method aimed at 
simplification of an otherwise difficult calculation. The burden of 
proof will always be on the Commission to show that the result 
arrived at in a specific ruling does not represent the proper application 
of objective criteria. It is necessary to bear in mind the function of the 
State aid rules in this context, and the competence of the Commission 
and the courts in ensuring observance of those rules: it is not for the 
Commission to police the application of tax rules, nor to substitute its 
own idea of a good system for that of a Member State. But what the 
Commission can and must do is check that the transfer pricing 
methods applied by a Member State do not create an automatic 
advantage for one or more categories of companies, that accepted 
methods are applied in a coherent way, and that methods which depart 
from the norm—where national legislation permits taxpayers to 
propose alternative methods—nevertheless arrive at a result which is 
a good or at least defendable approximation of a market price. 
The Commission decisions which prompted the present Essay 
concern individual rulings by national tax authorities. In some 
respects that facilitates the analysis by the Commission. The sole 
element that is really in issue is the existence of an advantage in 
comparison with other companies. Since each ruling concerns a single 
company there is no need to linger long on the issue of selectivity, 
and the issue of consistency with the nature and logic of the tax 
system can hardly be thought to arise. 
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CONCLUSION 
The decisions of the European Commission of June 11, 2014 and 
October 7, 2014 to open the formal investigation procedure in relation 
to certain advance pricing arrangements are an indication of its desire 
to contribute, through the application of the State aid rules, to fair tax 
competition and to the fight against tax base erosion. There is nothing 
novel or unconventional in deployment of State aid control in the 
manner adopted by the Commission in these decisions, irrespective of 
the particular background. On the contrary, the decisions are firmly in 
line with previous practice and follow well established principles in 
the identification of fiscal State aid, notably in the determination of a 
selective advantage. 
It may nevertheless be questioned whether the State aid rules 
truly provide an appropriate instrument for the control of phenomena 
such as profit-shifting by multi-national corporate groups. The 
problem is necessarily a cross-border one—the corporate group 
derives a benefit from a combination of national tax structures and 
measures—while State aid analysis looks at a measure of a single 
State. State aid control cannot, by its nature, capture the exploitation 
of mismatches between national rules. Moreover, in such a context it 
may be impossible to demonstrate the renunciation of State resources 
that would normally be acquired through taxation. For example, in the 
celebrated double Irish manoeuvre, it is not easy to see where Ireland 
has lost tax that should normally have been paid there. The very intent 
of the structure is to escape taxation not in Ireland but in another 
jurisdiction.  
Closer examination of the circumstances lying behind some of 
the decisions discussed here suggests that in a properly functioning 
system—and one in which taxation corresponds to the location of 
economic activity—a certain proportion of the revenue alleged to 
have been forgone by the national authorities would in fact be taxed 
elsewhere. That indicates that the underlying problem is one that State 
aid control is not well fitted to resolve, and indeed such a task lies 
outside its intended function. 
 
